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Unlike in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin is not seeking to annihilate the sovereignty and national identity of Moldova and Georgia by reducing cities to rubble and formally annexing territory. The two countries, once part of the Soviet Union, are nevertheless subject to malign Russian influence aimed at preventing them from choosing their own paths at home and abroad. Each deserves more vigorous, well-crafted support from the US and its European allies.
The Kremlin deployed its dark arts in Sunday’s Moldovan presidential election and referendum on enshrining the country’s aspirations to EU membership in the constitution. They have been no less evident in the campaign for Georgia’s parliamentary elections to be held on October 26. By overt and underhand methods, Moscow supports anti-western, anti-democratic forces for the purpose of corralling both countries into what it sees as its rightful, predominant sphere of influence in the post-Soviet area.
Moldova’s two votes fell short of delivering the unequivocal pro-western message for which President Maia Sandu was hoping. Having failed to win an outright victory in the presidential election, Sandu faces a run-off on November 3 against a Russian-backed opponent. On a relatively low turnout, the EU referendum produced the narrowest of majorities in favour of the constitutional change that Sandu favours.
Russian disinformation and vote-buying played a part in the disappointing results. The EU’s diplomatic service said “Russia and its proxies actively tried to undermine the democratic and voting processes in Moldova”. But that is not the whole story. Parts of the country, such as the autonomous region of Gagauzia, have leaned towards Russia since Moldova gained independence in 1991 from the USSR. Other voters were voicing dissatisfaction with low living standards, corruption and the failure to reform Moldova’s judicial system.
In other words, Sandu has discovered what other European leaders before her have learnt to their cost: people voting in a referendum often have other things on their mind than the question asked. There was no compelling reason for Sandu to call the referendum. Even to include Moldova’s EU ambitions in the constitution may not change much.
A similar clause in Georgia’s constitution came into effect in 2018. However, it has not prevented Bidzina Ivanishvili, the de facto strongman ruler, from adopting illiberal policies so far removed from EU norms that the bloc has, for the moment, frozen Georgia’s membership bid. The US and EU have been slow to grasp the seriousness of the threat that Ivanishvili, with or without Russian support, poses to democracy and civil liberties in Georgia.
In Moldova, the president’s powers are limited, so the biggest test for Sandu’s pro-western course will come in parliamentary elections that must be held by next July. Europe and the US should step up economic support, combat Russian espionage and propaganda, and accelerate Moldova’s path to EU membership. Sandu and her allies also need to intensify domestic reforms, particularly on the rule of law, that are a prerequisite for joining the EU.
In Georgia, the challenge takes a different form. There are strong reasons for doubting whether this weekend’s elections will be free and fair. There is likewise no indication that, if against almost all odds the democratic opposition were to win, Ivanishvili and his party would step down from power.
In the event of post-election unrest, the EU and US should stand ready to serve as mediators. If Ivanishvili stays in power unfairly and continues his democratic backsliding, punitive measures against him — rather than the Georgian people — will be necessary. As in Ukraine, the west’s fundamental interest lies in protecting the right of Moldova and Georgia, free of Russian threats, to determine their destinies.