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In the days after Hamas’s devastating October 7 attack, Benjamin Netanyahu’s political career looked finished. Israel’s prime minister and self-styled “Mr Security” had just overseen the country’s worst-ever security failure, and the deadliest day for Jews since the Holocaust.
But as Israelis marked the grim anniversary of Hamas’s assault this week, after a tumultuous year in which the Middle East slid ever deeper into conflict, Israel’s most ruthless political operator was still at the helm.
Over the past 12 months, he has turned Israel’s fire on foes from Gaza and the occupied West Bank to Lebanon and Iran, and defied calls from the US and his own security chiefs for a ceasefire. Channelling the rage of a traumatised nation, he now pledges not just “total victory” over Hamas, but to “change the balance of power in the region for years”.
“Netanyahu has always had a sort of messianic belief that he is the only one who can save Israel from the dangers it faces,” says Aviv Bushinsky, who served as his chief of staff in the early 2000s. “That’s what drives him. Period.”
October 7 destroyed that image. Hamas’s attack was a catastrophic refutation of Netanyahu’s years-long approach of attempting to tame the militant group through a mix of military deterrence and economic inducements. It shook Israelis’ faith in their country’s security apparatus. Netanyahu’s long refusal to apologise for the failures that preceded it enraged his compatriots.
Ministers were heckled when they appeared in public. On streets not far from Netanyahu’s Jerusalem residence, “Fuck Bibi” — a reference to his childhood nickname — was repeatedly scrawled, scrubbed away and re-scrawled. Had there been a mechanism in his Likud party to replace him in the days after October 7, insiders say he might well have been removed.
Instead, Israel’s longest-serving prime minister clung on. He launched a ferocious bombardment and offensive in Gaza. But in the early days of the war, under US pressure and wary of opening a second front, he opted against colleagues’ calls for an all-out strike on Hizbollah, which had begun firing at Israel in support of Hamas.
Now, after devastating Gaza, Israel is ramping up its attacks elsewhere. In July, senior Hizbollah and Hamas figures were assassinated in Beirut and Tehran. In recent weeks, Israel has dramatically escalated its campaign against Hizbollah, killing its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, bombing thousands of targets and invading Lebanon.
For some, the shift is less a change in Netanyahu’s approach than the result of the evolving dynamics of the war, and a belated implementation of plans long advocated by security chiefs. “These moves up north . . . are things the [military] and Mossad were pushing for a year,” says Anshel Pfeffer, author of a biography of Netanyahu and journalist at The Economist. “Netanyahu remains someone who usually does not want to take action.”
But others say the successes against Hizbollah have emboldened the 74-year-old as Israel’s leaders weigh one of the war’s most consequential decisions: how to respond to the 180-missile barrage that Iran unleashed at Israel in retaliation for the Beirut and Tehran assassinations. “The more success there has been on the battlefield, the more he has gained confidence,” says Bushinsky. “As we say in Hebrew, when the food comes, the appetite grows.”
Abroad, the multifront campaign has deepened Israel’s isolation. The Gaza offensive has sparked international legal moves against Israel and Netanyahu. His refusal to agree a ceasefire deal in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages still held by Hamas has infuriated the Biden administration.
At home, even as many Israelis believe Netanyahu is paying as much heed to his own political calculations as strategic imperatives, the spiralling conflict has been accompanied by a revival of his political fortunes. Likud once again tops opinion polls. The same surveys still suggest Netanyahu’s coalition would lose an election tomorrow. But given the scale of the October 7 debacle, few expected any recovery. “It’s the mother and father of resurrections,” says Bushinsky.
It is not the first time Netanyahu has surprised his critics. After serving in one of Israel’s elite commando units, Netanyahu became prime minister for the first time in 1996. Ousted in 1999, he bounced back in 2009. Defeated again in 2021, he returned in 2022, outmanoeuvring mainstream parties that shunned him over graft charges — which he denies — by assembling the most hard-right government in Israel’s history.
Over the past year, the coalition has wobbled. Two far-right parties have repeatedly threatened to quit if he makes concessions to the Palestinians. Netanyahu has also feuded with defence minister Yoav Gallant, with whom he is barely on speaking terms, according to people with knowledge of the relationship. Ever the arch-manipulator, he has bolstered his majority by adding the party of Gideon Sa’ar — his ally-turned-enemy-turned ally — to the coalition.
Since Iran’s barrage, hawks have demanded he seize the chance to attack Tehran’s nuclear programme, widely seen as the most serious strategic threat to Israel. The US is pushing for a lesser response, such as hitting Iranian military targets.
“Netanyahu has talked about Iran for years and years . . . and sees it as the biggest threat. And now there is domestic support and from the US for him to do something. That is a big shift in the game,” says Nadav Shtrauchler, a political strategist who has worked with Netanyahu. “It’s not a question of whether he will act, but how.”