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These are trying times for Ukraine. Four months in, its counteroffensive against Russia’s invasion has not achieved the hoped-for breakthroughs. Support for Kyiv, meanwhile, is becoming a political football in some western allies. The US Congress at the weekend jettisoned $6bn of aid to Kyiv to avert a government shutdown. In Slovakia, populist Robert Fico’s party won the highest vote in an election with an anti-Ukraine stance, days after Poland’s premier appeared to threaten a halt in weapons donations to Kyiv amid a dispute over grain exports. The conclusion is clear: Ukraine’s western allies must find ways both to speed up support for Ukraine and to lock it in for the future, in what now seems set to be a multiyear war of attrition.
Anti-Ukraine currents in western politics should not be overstated. The handful of hard-right Republicans in Congress are outliers. Fico’s Smer party won only 23 per cent of Slovakia’s vote. Poland’s nationalist Law and Justice party is fighting to retain its parliamentary majority in elections. But rash electoral rhetoric can influence how parties act in power — and minority hardliners can find ways to hold the rest to ransom. A Fico-led Slovakia, if it happens, might join Hungary in a central European “awkward squad”.
US president Joe Biden insists agreement will be reached on all the further $24bn of aid for Ukraine the White House is seeking, but the politics are tortuous. And the whole episode is a reminder that Donald Trump could yet be back as president in 16 months.
Support for Kyiv, then, must be future-proofed as far as possible. The EU is wisely seeking to pass a four-year, €50bn “Ukraine Facility”, though the deal is not yet formally done. Cumulative EU budgetary support to wartime Ukraine is set to surpass that from the US this year. Europe, including the UK, may need to take on more of the financial and military burden if the US political situation worsens. Much responsibility falls on the biggest EU countries, France, Germany, and Italy, to hold the line — not easy when key opposition parties show pro-Russian sympathies.
Efforts also need to be redoubled to enable Ukraine to become more economically self-reliant. War risk insurance to cover losses for domestic and foreign investors would help to create confidence to invest in urgent rebuilding projects and in boosting Ukraine’s defence production capacity. So would providing more air defence systems to cities beyond Kyiv — which could also potentially encourage more refugees to return from abroad. Supplying Ukraine with more anti-ship missiles would help it secure vital Black Sea export routes for its grain and steel.
If it is to break through heavily fortified Russian lines and retake territory, Ukraine must be given vital tools — including F16 fighter jets and long-range missiles. Its military needs to be modernised and shifted more on to Nato-standard weaponry. Western training of its troops should be more rigorous and comprehensive, but tailored more to Ukrainians’ preferred way of fighting.
Ukrainians need more reassurance, too, that their country has an assured future in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Nato’s July summit ended in an awkward fudge. But an EU summit in December should commit to opening accession talks with Kyiv — provided Ukraine, too, has met agreed targets on reforms and fighting corruption.
In a cost of living squeeze, it is easy for populist parties to insist spending should be funnelled to domestic priorities. But Kyiv’s supporters have a powerful message they should shout from the rooftops: the costs of supporting Ukraine’s fight are tiny compared with those of allowing Putin’s Russia to prevail.