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The writer is an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs
Many western countries are equivocal about Ukraine’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Unlike Kyiv, they do not worry much about the stability of a possible ceasefire or peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Many, wary of committing resources to a long-term stalemate, might urge President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to accept a questionable deal today rather than pursuing principle in a bloody and open-ended campaign. Although mostly not allied to Russia, numerous right and leftwing groups in the west, as well as states from Hungary to Brazil, have urged, either implicitly or explicitly, Kyiv to make concessions to Moscow to achieve peace.
Yet even politicians and governments who are keen for Ukraine to accept compromises on its freedom and self-determination cannot separate their advice to Kyiv from broader issues of international stability and security. Even if Ukraine is geographically, culturally, historically, and politically remote from Washington, London or Brussels — not to mention capitals in Asia, Africa or Latin America — it would be wrong to write this off as merely a post-Soviet, or intra-Slavic dispute.
Between 1945 and 1991, the Ukrainian Soviet republic was, unlike the Russian Soviet republic, a non-sovereign member of the UN. Post-Soviet Ukraine became, after gaining independence in August 1991, not only a regular member of the UN but also a participant of the Council of Europe, OSCE, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, among other bodies.
For this reason, Russia’s official annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula in 2014 had already created a fundamental problem for the international community of states. Moscow insists that Ukraine has no right to sovereignty. Yet the functioning of the international legal order supposes that it does.
Eight years after its armed capture of Crimea, Russia doubled down on its denial of Ukrainian statehood. In September 2022, it officially annexed four more regions, now in Ukraine’s south-eastern mainland. This additional violation of international law, as well as Moscow’s escalating terror campaign against Ukraine’s civilian population and infrastructure, have increased the stakes further.
Nine years ago, the Kremlin’s allegations about the disputed status of Crimea were partially accepted by the international community. But few today would accept Moscow’s odious justifications for its outrageous behaviour in Ukraine. Self-proclaimed pragmatists and pacifists across the world express sincere sympathy for Ukraine and its people. Their ceasefire or peace proposals might even have been founded in the mistaken belief that they correspond to the assumed real interests of the Ukrainian population.
Yet there is a moral hazard in this way of thinking. What authority and legitimacy will the UN and European security order have if Russia is allowed to violate dozens of its bilateral and multilateral commitments within international treaties and organisations? Third countries that accept and legitimise a deal resulting in net gains for Russia would not only be disparaging Ukraine’s political sovereignty and territorial integrity, they would also be breaching their legal obligations by allowing Moscow to harvest the fruits of its aggression.
This risks encouraging other revanchist countries and may strike fear into those who dread the same treatment as the Ukrainians. Why should other relatively powerful countries, with semi-plausible justifications, not encroach upon their neighbours? Aren’t some other territories, whether in Asia, Africa or elsewhere, waiting to be brought home in just the same way as Crimea and “New Russia”?
Given this hazard, why would the governments of relatively weak nations across the world continue to rely on international law for the protection of their borders, territories, and independence? If western governments signal that they cannot be counted on as staunch defenders of the international order, then it weakens these institutions.
As long as Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine continues, there is no other way to counter it than to meet force with force. This is in full accordance with international law, in general, and the UN charter’s article 51, in particular. Compromises, concessions and other allowances to an aggressor state are no way towards a durable peace. Those urging Kyiv to engage in any such negotiations should consider the full implications of this course of action — not just for Ukraine, but also for vulnerable states far beyond its borders.