Singapore’s prime minister Lee Hsien Loong recently managed what few other global leaders would be able or willing to do: travel to China and publicly praise a US-led Asian initiative.
“Asia should always remain an open region,” Lee said at the Boao Forum for Asia in Hainan. “As Asian countries develop co-operation among ourselves, we should also cultivate our relations with the US, Europe and other parts of the world.”
That Lee commended the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework — a trade initiative intended to reassert US engagement in the region with an alternative to Beijing’s economic statecraft — at one of China’s largest annual international conferences pleased many American policymakers, said one US official based in Singapore who asked to remain anonymous.
The event underscored the level of comfort that Singapore, one of Washington’s most important non-treaty allies in Asia, has attained with its long-term partner in a new phase of heightened Sino-US competition. The city-state carefully balances its economic relationship with China and its reliance on the US for security.
But Singapore has become more active in deepening its defence ties with the US over the past several years, one of the only south-east Asian countries to do so aside from the Philippines, despite its friendly relations with Beijing and a recent influx of people and wealth from mainland China, risking tensions with its largest trading partner.
In March, the US Air Force-operated RQ-4 Global Hawk, a stealth aircraft known for its surveillance capabilities and capacity to transmit time-sensitive targeting details, was revealed to have been deployed on a short-term basis from Singapore’s Changi airport.
The previous month, Singapore announced that it would exercise an option to acquire eight more F-35 fighter jets from the US, increasing its order to 12.
“Both of these actions sent a strong signal about how Singapore feels right now about its strong relationship with the US,” said a former diplomat in Singapore familiar with the government’s thinking. “Deploying Global Hawk in the backyard of the South China Sea? The optics of that send a message.”
For Singapore, which allows US forces to access its air and naval facilities on a rotational basis as part of a 1990 agreement, the strategic logic is straightforward. It believes an American presence in Asia — especially its military presence — is beneficial to its own interests and regional security.
The F-35 deal was particularly important, said experts, because other US allies in the region, including Japan, South Korea and Australia, had also purchased the stealth fighters. This would enable interoperability — where one country’s air force flies missions with partners that are similarly equipped.
“By 2035, there will be an estimated 300 F-35s in the Indo-Pacific region, with the majority in Australia, Japan and South Korea,” said Nicholas Fang, director of security and global affairs at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs. “In the event of a conflict, there is the possibility of a unified network of such aircraft from US allies operating in concert, and Singapore could potentially be a part of that.”
Ja Ian Chong, associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore, said the strengthened ties meant that Singapore would be dependent on US military equipment and technology. “This is Singapore investing in the US system for a good decade or two,” he added. “It really locks [them] into that defence relationship.”
Research published this month by Australia’s Lowy Institute think-tank traced how the US-Singapore defence partnership has been upgraded since 2019, with increased arms procurements, more joint training and deployments of personnel and equipment.
The US Indo-Pacific Command boosted its personnel in Singapore by 12 per cent between 2018 and 2021, according to the report’s authors, while the city-state buys more arms equipment from the US than any other country in south-east Asia.
Last year, Singapore, along with Japan and Australia, for the first time took part in Garuda Shield, an annual joint exercise between the US and Indonesia. In June, the US will send its largest delegation to attend the annual Shangri-La Dialogue — billed as Asia’s leading defence summit — since before the pandemic.
“Unlike the rest of south-east Asia, Singapore is more active in its balancing,” said Susannah Patton, director of the south-east Asia programme for the Lowy Institute. “Rather than withholding its support or endorsement from a partner, it looks to actively make itself indispensable.”
For now, China has not challenged Singapore’s delicate balancing act. But Beijing is also seeking to boost its security relationship with Singapore and south-east Asia, including greater military engagement, raising the prospect of another front for tensions, according to policymakers and officials. This week, China held its first military drills with Singapore since 2021.
“This potentially creates problems down the track if you rely heavily on US systems and equipment,” said one defence expert who has advised several Asian governments.
Singapore is also grappling with ever-closer cultural ties to China. The city-state’s resident population is more than 70 per cent ethnic Chinese. These connections have grown with inflows of people and capital, with the financial hub a top destination for mainland citizens fleeing restrictive Covid-19 policies and President Xi Jinping’s regulatory crackdown on business.
Singapore’s position has become more difficult as hostility between the US and China escalates, particularly over Taiwan and the South China Sea.
“There are several points of stress approaching . . . especially as [Singapore’s] economic dependence and cultural ties to China have grown considerably in the past few years,” said Chong.
“The neutral approach works until it doesn’t. It is unclear what Singapore’s fallback position is when it doesn’t.”