Is Washington prepared for a post-Putin Russia?

There are few certainties in war, but there is one about the conflict in Ukraine that bears repeating now, at this critical moment in time: it will, like all other wars, come to an end. And Vladimir Putin, like all other leaders, will pass on.

There have been times in recent months when it appeared that the west’s entire foreign policy establishment had forgotten those inevitabilities, with few able to think beyond Kyiv’s much-vaunted spring counteroffensive. Policymakers in Washington and other Nato capitals became armchair tacticians overnight, only thinking of their short-term responses to possible Crimean incursions, or Russian sabotage schemes, or extended battlefield stalemates.

Last week’s coup attempt by Russian strongman Yevgeny Prigozhin, though it failed on the road to Moscow, had the salutary effect of reminding the world that there will still be a Russia on Europe’s periphery once Putin departs the scene — and he may well depart at a time that is not of his own choosing. The west’s shock at the rapidly unfolding events — and its seeming befuddlement at how to respond — should be the moment Washington reminds itself that planning for peace is at least as important as planning for war.

In a recent column in the Financial Times, former Finnish prime minister Alexander Stubb, who is often mentioned as a possible foreign affairs chief in the next European Commission, framed the challenge this way: three times over the past century the world had the chance to reorganise itself in a way that would maximise the prospects for peace and prosperity. In 1919, the world famously failed miserably. In 1945, chastened by the failures of the earlier generation and traumatised by a truly global war, the west mostly got it right. And 1989 — well, the verdict is still out. Stubb argued Putin’s invasion opens a historic window akin to those three watershed years. History will judge whether 2022 will be another 1919, or a 1945, or a 1989.

It may seem facile to attempt to briskly synthesise the lessons from the peaces agreed at the end of the first world war, second world war and cold war. Indeed, libraries are full of books on this very subject, many of which, I’ve noticed, are being re-read by journalists, politicians and policymakers alike. But let me offer one thought, based both on my own layman’s reading of history and on two decades of reporting on conflicts.

If there is one lesson that comes through whether you’re reading about Paris in 1919 or more recent peace agreements in Dayton in 1995 or on Good Friday in 1998, it is this: peace cannot be durable unless all major powers — including those defeated on the battlefield, and those guilty, frankly, of horrific bad acts — are brought into the fold and treated like equals.

The failure to do so destroyed the peace following the “war to end all wars”. The US, which emerged from the conflict as a global power for the first time, returned to its own shores and wallowed in isolationism. Germany was punished with vindictive reparations. Anti-colonial movements in Africa and Asia were ignored.

Similarly, it could be argued, the failures of 1989 can be traced to an inability to integrate one-time rivals in Moscow and Minsk into a new security architecture. Nato halfheartedly launched an initiative called “partnership for peace”, which included all of the non-Nato former Soviet states, and there was even a Nato-Russia Council, which I was forced to cover on multiple occasions. But nobody in the west really believed Russia belonged in the club. Nato would remain, in the words of its first secretary-general, a place to keep the Americans in, the Germans down and the Russians out.

Is the west prepared to reintegrate a post-Putin Russia into the family of civilised nations? I see few signs of it. Indeed, just the opposite: the EU is currently debating using frozen Russian assets to pay for Ukrainian reconstruction — an initiative opposed by Germany, which (as previously noted) has a rather tortured history with demands on defeated powers to pay postwar reparations. The most high-profile effort to address a postwar Russia appears to have been last month’s gathering of a ragtag collection of opposition groups in Brussels, which broke up with even more divisions than when it started.

Although the Brussels conclave was a worthy effort, the west needs to be more realistic. The post-Putin Russia we are to inherit will probably be led by a man more Yevgeny Prigozhin than Alexei Navalny. It could even be more thuggish, more corrupt, more chauvinistic. What it cannot be is more destabilising. We must be ready for a peace that sees Russia leave Ukraine completely, disavow further regional adventurism — but is led by a regime we find odious. And we must be prepared to welcome that regime back to the top table of international affairs — complete with sanctions lifted and assets unfrozen. Along with western security guarantees for Ukraine, it is an endgame that Washington should be planning for and articulating publicly, so that the next Prigozhin knows that a free Ukraine and a stable Europe are the finite price of a post-Putin world. Making the case out loud may well hasten the day.

The question I have for you, Pilita, is whether I’ve completely lost my moral compass. I have long advocated for a return of human rights and democratic values to the centre of American foreign policy. But here I am advocating for a Kissingerian view of the Ukraine crisis that could well leave a detestable leader in the Kremlin and the Russian people suffering under his yoke. In the current overheated geopolitical environment, it feels like a cop-out even as I write it. Justice delayed, after all, is justice denied. But I still contend that we must play the long game. It is, after all, the deal with the Soviet devil we agreed during the cold war. An end to this war — on terms acceptable to Kyiv — must be the west’s overriding priority, regardless of who is on the other side of the negotiating table. All the rest can come later.

Recommended reading

• For a darker view of a post-Putin future, I recommend the new issue of Foreign Affairs magazine where Eugene Rumer, a former intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the US national intelligence council, warns that Russian society’s “phantom pains of the old empire” and complicity on Putin’s war mean the west is likely headed for a new cold war-style stand-off with the Kremlin, with Ukraine instead of Germany on the front lines.

• There are few in Washington who believe Putin is anything but severely wounded after Prigozhin’s coup attempt. Indeed, officials dismiss arguments that he has actually reinforced his position by ridding himself of a turbulent priest as little more than Russian propaganda. But Julia Ioffe, a respected observer of Russian society and politics at Puck, has a spirited go at making the case in her “post-coup report”.

• Is Kyiv’s counteroffensive off to a disappointing start? There are many in Washington policymaking circles that worry about its plodding approach to Russian minefields and other entrenched defences, which could deny the operation the benefit of the Prigozhin-triggered bloodletting in the Kremlin. In a rare interview with The Washington Post, Ukraine’s top military officer says such criticism “pisses me off”.

Pilita Clark responds

Peter, you know I could never accuse a man as exemplary as your good self of misplacing his moral compass.

I share your fear that peace in Ukraine may require the west to make some deeply unpleasant choices. But the events of the past week have made me far more concerned about what is likely to happen in the short term. 

Yevgeny Prigozhin’s coup attempt was a jolting reminder of what could lie ahead. It was striking to see crowds of openly enthusiastic well-wishers surrounding Prigozhin as he left Rostov-on-Don, apparently cheered to see an anti-elite populist speaking some form of truth to power.

Saying that, I think it is too soon to say a post-Putin Russia is more likely to be led by someone more like an erratic exiled warlord than an Alexei Navalny. 

What does seem probable is that, if there was even a sliver of hope that Putin was quietly manoeuvring to end his disastrous war against Ukraine any time soon, Prigozhin’s abortive mutiny has ended it.

A Russian withdrawal without the decisive victory Putin has always promised could look like a panicky response to that revolt, brief and strange as it was. And if Prigozhin’s move signified any wider vulnerability for Putin at home, an imminent pullout would seem unwise.

That suggests the war in Ukraine may last a lot longer than many in the west expect, or are prepared for.

I know some thoughtful commentators have always maintained Putin was ready to fight on to the end of next year at least, believing western resolve would crumble. But either way, it seems to me the events of the past week have done nothing to diminish that awful prospect.